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 Legal Environment for Technology Transfer in
 Taiwan
 Professor Kung-Chung Liu*
 I. Historical Context
 In an effort to become an industrialized country, Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC)
 has relied heavily on technology transfers and investment from abroad. The Taiwanese
 government adopted a heavy-handed policy of regulating investments made by foreigners
 and overseas Chinese in 1954. These policies include the Foreigner Investment Act (FIA)
 and the Overseas Chinese Investment Act (OCIA), which require all foreigners and overseas
 Chinese to obtain the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) approval prior to making any
 investments.1 Such investments may also be in the form of patents, trademarks, copyright,
 know-how, and other intellectual property (IP).2 In 1962, the Technology Cooperation Law
 (TCL) was enacted to regulate those investments that provided patents and know-how in
 return for royalties instead of capital stock.3 The TCL marked the commencement of an
 era in which state-directed intervention was used to control the direction and results of
 technology transfer from a strategic viewpoint of national development and the optimal use
 of scarce foreign exchange reserves. The TCL was complemented with a network of laws
 providing a variety of incentives.
 The TCL prescribed that technology cooperation contracts would need to be approved
 by the Investment Commission, MOEA, before they could actually come into effect. This
 control mechanism left room for the MOEA to balance domestic and foreign interests.4 If
 a contract that came under the jurisdiction of the TCL had not been approved, then the
 payment of royalties could not be deducted for taxation purposes and the royalties could
 not be remitted abroad. Presumably, the court's incompetence in handling cases involving
 *Ph.D. of Law, 1991, Munich University. Research Fellow, Head of Legal Division, Institute of Social
 Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
 1. Foreigner Investment Act, art. 8 (1997) (ROC); Overseas Chinese Investment Act, art. 8 (1997) (ROC).
 2. Id. art. 6(3).
 3. Technology Cooperation Law, art. 3(1) (1962) (ROC).
 4. Id. art. 7 (The article provides that: "Technology cooperation contracts should include 1. Names, spec-
 ifications and quantity of the products or the services that were the objects of technology cooperation; 2.
 Contents of patents and know-how, the usage plan and benefits of technology recipients; 3. Royalties and ways
 of payment.").
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 foreign parties led to article 8 of the TCL, which mandated that disputes with foreign ele-
 ments be solved by way of arbitration. Article 8 might also have presented a handy way for
 foreign parties to avoid the courts and their lengthy procedures. Nonetheless, the courts were
 thereby deprived of the chance to learn by doing. Consequently, no case law developed and
 guidance with regard to cross-border technology transfer or license is not readily available.
 The TCL was amended only once in 1964 and abolished in 1995. Yet the FIA, OCIA, and
 the incentive mechanisms continue to survive the test of time. In recent years, government
 regulation focuses more on outward technology transfers, especially to Mainland China.
 No statistics on the total number of technology cooperation contracts are available, how-
 ever, a study from 1983 shows that there were 1,616 technology cooperation contracts with
 foreigners, among them, 67 percent were with the Japanese, 2 1 percent with the Americans,
 and the remaining 12 percent with the Europeans.5 To a great extent this ratio still holds
 true. The TLC's overall effect on technology development in Taiwan is hard to estimate.
 However, it did function as a kind of buffer for domestic companies who needed a helping
 hand from the government to cut a better deal with foreign counterparts.
 EL. Government Regulation on Technology Transfer
 A. On Inward Investments and Technology Cooperation
 The Taiwanese government frequently uses incentive mechanisms to promote and en-
 courage inward investments. Tax exemption and reduction are the instruments most often
 deployed. As a general rule, the Income Tax Law (ITL) exempts from income taxes the
 following two types of royalties paid by domestic undertakings to foreign businesses:
 (1) royalties paid under special government permission for the use of patents, trademarks,
 and other franchises to introduce new production technology or products, to improve the
 quality of products, or to reduce production costs; and (2) royalties approved by the gov-
 ernment and paid by the "important manufacturing undertakings" for the purpose of build-
 ing factories.6 In specific areas, tax offset and reduction regime is also being provided. The
 Investment Stimulation Law (ISL), which passed in 1960 and expired on December 31,
 1990, stipulated that undertakings that invested outward and acquired government approval
 to transfer technology domestically, could apply for tax exemption according to article 6.7
 Furthermore, such undertakings could postpone the beginning of their tax exemption pe-
 riod for one to four years according to article 7, mutatis mutandis.* Two days before the ISL
 expired, the Legislative Yuan, namely the Congress, enacted the Industries-Upgrading Fa-
 cilitation Law, which maintains the extensive tax immunity and reduction for another
 nineteen years, to the end of 2009. The provisions pertaining to technology transfer are
 as follows.
 5. Mao Rong Huang, The TCL Amendment Draft (in Chinese) art. 1-9 (1993).
 6. Income 1 ax Law, art. 4, (2 1) (2001) (ROC). (However, the tenu important manufacturing undertakings
 is not defined by the ITL).
 7. Investment Stimulation Law, art. 8 (1960) (ROC).
 8. Id.
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 1 . Offsetting Investment Expenditures
 Five to 20 percent of the expenditure on investments in the following technologies may
 be used to offset business income taxes for that year or, when the former exceeds the latter,
 over the following four years. The technologies include automation technology, resource
 recycling technology, anti-pollution technology, new or clean energy utilizing technology,
 energy conserving technology, technology that recycles water used by the industry, green
 house emission reducing technology, and energy efficiency enhancing technology, hard and
 software, and technology for enhancing the digital information capacity of the businesses
 in the areas of Internet, TV function, business resource planning, communications and
 telecom products, electronic and TV conference facilities, and digital contents.9
 As for the expenditure spent on research and development (R&D) and personnel training,
 a more generous exemption is provided for: 5 to 35 percent can offset the business income
 taxes for that year. If that expenditure exceeds the average expenditure for the last two years,
 up to 50 percent of the exceeding amount can be offset against the business income taxes
 for that year, or when the exceeding amount cannot be entirely offset, the following four
 years.10 However, the amount that is to be offset may not exceed 50 percent of the business
 income taxes for that year, unless it is the last year in which it can be offset.11
 2. Certain Royalties Tax-Free
 Fifty percent of the royalties collected by the citizens of the ROC for licensing or the
 sale of their patents on undertakings based in the ROC is immune from income tax.12 Article
 24 of the Enforcement Rules of the Industries-Upgrading Facilitation Law further pre-
 scribes three criteria for the tax exemption: (1) contents of the patents must pertain to the
 activity items listed on the commercial certificate of the licensees or buyers of the patents;
 (2) the licensees or buyers of the patents may only use the patents for manufacture, R&D,
 providing services, or production carried out by other undertakings for the licensees or
 buyers; (3) the royalties or the sales price for patents must conform with the objective and
 fair market value information.
 In decision number 2786 of 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court adjudicated that no
 tax exemption is available for agreements where the assignee's duty to pay royalties is con-
 tingent upon approval of the tax exemption. The assignee was allowed to use the utility
 models of the assignor to manufacture and sell products, free of charge, before the utility
 models were assigned to the assignee, and where the variation of royalties was not based
 on profits but motivated by the fact that the taxation authority had already rejected another
 application for tax exemption filed by the spouse of the licensor.13 In order to encourage the
 establishment of operation headquarters in Taiwan, the Industries-Upgrading Facilitation
 Law exempts operation headquarters from paying the following business income taxes:
 1 . Incomes derived from the provision of management services or R&D to foreign re-
 lated businesses,
 9. Industries-Upgrading Facilitation Law, art. 6(1) (2002) (ROC).
 10. Id. art. 6(2).
 11. Id. art. 6(3).
 12. Mart. 11.
 13. Decision 2786 (1998) of the Supreme Administrative Court, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw (last
 visited Aug. 18,2002).
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 2. Royalties received from foreign related businesses, and
 3. Revenues generated from the investments on foreign related businesses.14
 The requirements and procedures for qualifying as an operation headquarters are deter-
 mined by the Executive Yuan.15
 Another source of preferential taxation can be found in the Law Aims to Encourage
 Private Businesses to Undertake Transportation Construction, effective since December 5,
 1994. It contains several provisions that are related to technology transfer:
 1. The stimulation measurements apply only to the construction and management of
 the following major transportation projects: railroads, highways, mass transportation
 systems, airports, harbors, parking facilities, important leisure facilities, bridges,
 and tunnels.16
 2. A maximum period of five years of business income tax exemption is available, begin-
 ning from the year in which the transportation projects bear taxable revenues.17
 3. From 5 to 20 percent of the expenditure on investments in construction and man-
 agement technology, on the acquisition of anti-pollution technology, and R&D may
 offset the business income tax of that year, and when necessary, over the following
 four years.
 B. On Outward Investments and Technology Cooperation
 Transformed gradually from an importer of investments and technologies to an exporter,
 Taiwanese businesses have made 6,817 outward investments with a total value of U.S.$26
 billion and seventy-five technology cooperation contracts in the years from 1952 to 2000.18
 In 1996, the MOEA decided to extend its regulatory arm to outward investments and
 technology cooperation made by indigenous entities. It promulgated, without any statutory
 authorization, die Rules on the Review of Outward Investments and Technology Cooper-
 ation. Article 6 of the Rules requires that outward investments and technology cooperation
 must in principle be submitted to the Investment Commission, MOEA, for approval.
 The tension and even military confrontation between Taiwan and Mainland China has
 existed since 1949, as both sides claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of China
 and sought reunification. While Mainland China opened up over the last twenty-four years
 and has accomplished remarkable economic success, Taiwan, on the other hand, has made
 a further transition to a full democracy. For the Taiwanese, reunification is no longer a
 matter of ideology, but one of the options that people can democratically choose. But for
 Mainland China, that concept is incomprehensible and even betrayal. As a result, in 1996
 Mainland China launched two blank missiles at the seas around Taiwan, and twice tried
 fruitlessly to influence the outcome of presidential elections. In response, the Taiwanese
 government, under the Cross Straits People's Relation Act, not only established the need
 14. Industries-Upgrading Facilitation Law, art. 70(1) (2002) (ROC).
 15. Id. art. 70b.
 16. Law Aims to Encourage Private Businesses to Undertake Transportation Construction, art. 5 (1994)
 (ROC).
 17. Id. art. 28.
 18. This is by far underestimated. Ministry of Economic Affairs R.O.C., Statistics of Economic and Trade,
 available at http://www.moeaic.gov.tw (last visited Aug. 18, 2002).
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 for prior approval for any investment and technology transfers with Mainland China, but
 also declared a so-called Less Haste, More Endurance policy. Accordingly, citizens, legal
 persons, groups, and other institutions of Taiwan first have to acquire approval from the
 MOEA before conducting any investments, technology cooperation, and business activities
 in the Mainland area. The stringency of this Act is partially mitigated by the Enforcement
 Rules of the Cross Straits People's Relation Act, which defines "business activities" as those
 announced by the competent central authorities as subject to permission or as prohibited.19
 The MOEA put two other regulations into force regarding investments and technology
 cooperation in the Mainland area: Rules on the Application for Approval of Investments
 and Technology Cooperation in the Mainland Area and the Principles for Reviewing In-
 vestments and Technology Cooperation in the Mainland Area. The former stipulates that
 technology cooperation in the Mainland area must be via a third region,20 and classifies
 investments and technology cooperation into three categories: (1) permissible, (2) prohib-
 itive, and (3) case-by-case approval.21
 The overly restrictive regulation and policy towards Mainland China did not serve the
 actual needs of most Taiwanese enterprises because it hampered their survival in an envi-
 ronment of comparative advantages, as most can be found abundantly in Mainland China.
 Moreover, it hampered the realization of Taiwan's development goal to become a regional
 operation center. At the end of August of 2001, the Less Haste, More Endurance policy
 was replaced by the Actively Open, Effectively Control policy. The new policy was pushed
 through mainly by non-government members of the Economic Development Council, an
 organization summoned and chaired by President Chen Shui-bian himself, who came into
 power in 2000 by winning the presidential election.
 However, one year thereafter, the Government has shown much reluctance in actively
 opening up and zeal for high-handed control over investment in Mainland China by intro-
 ducing investment ceiling for certain industry, such as silicon foundry, and restricting the
 movement of certain high tech professionals. The "One China" policy to which the Gov-
 ernment has adhered or at least paid lip service until 2000 has been replaced by the "Taiwan
 First" policy, if not by the "One Side, One Country" slogan.
 IH. Contract Law on the Technology Transfer or Licensing Agreements
 A. The Legal Nature of Technology Transfer or Licensing Agreements
 The Taiwanese Civil Code (CC) has its origin in the continental European legal system
 most notably in the German and Swiss Civil Code (BGB). Similar to the German law of
 contracts, first priority for the Taiwanese lawyer is to determine and qualify the nature of the
 contract concerned and apply the corresponding statutes accordingly - irrespective of the
 terms and language used by the parties. The Taiwanese CC does not provide any specific
 rules on technology transfer or licensing. Nor does it make any distinction between different
 types of technology transfer or licenses. However, the IP law does recognize some kind of
 19. Enforcement Rules of the Cross Straits People's Relation Act, art. 34(1) (1996) (ROC).
 20. Rules on the Application for Approval of Investments and 1 echnology Cooperation in the Mainland
 Area, art. 5(2) (1996) (ROC).
 21. /¿.art. 7.
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 compulsory licenses.22 Among the twenty-six types of contracts that are dealt with in the
 second part of the CC, the contract for work (Werkvertrag) is the most relevant and most
 often used by courts.
 The contract for work aims to accomplish a specific task,23 and differs from the contract
 for services (Dienstvertrag) in that while the provision of services is the direct purpose of
 the latter,24 the provision of services alone does not suffice for the specific work required
 for the former. The contract for work distinguishes itself further from the contract for
 mandate by the fact that the latter demands only that management be directed in a certain
 direction, whereas the former requires the accomplishment of a specified task.
 The requirement to accomplish a specified task has consequences for the risk distribution
 that may arise during the execution of a contract. In essence, the contractor for work bears
 all the risks regarding performance and remuneration until the work is accepted and should
 provide warranties against defects, regardless of negligence.25 This, however, is not in con-
 formity with common practice of technology transfer or licensing, which foresees that
 royalties be paid once the transfer takes place and later at regular intervals. Therefore, it is
 suggested that parties exclude by contract the application of CC provisions that rest the
 risk of payment with the contractor for work.
 Parties of the contract must agree upon the amount of royalties. In case no agreement is
 reached, article 491(2) of the CC stipulates that, "if the remuneration for the work was not
 agreed upon, it shall be determined by the tariffe. When no tariffe are available, it shall be
 determined according to customs."26 In decision number 1023 (2000), the Supreme Court
 expressed its opinion on this issue in a case involving an American engineering consulting
 company providing a technology transfer program to a local state-owned company.
 Although the remuneration for professional technicians is not comparable to that of the services
 provided by average people, it is nevertheless not boundless. The numerous tariffe set up by
 the government for various professional technicians speak for themselves. . . .While the first
 remuneration quotation made by the transferor was NT$2 7,978,000 which covered three pro-
 jects, the second was NT$29,500,000 and it covered only two projects. As such the transferee
 deemed the remuneration as excessive and it is not without reason.27
 However, it is dangerous for the Supreme Court to occupy itself with matters of fact and
 professional remuneration instead of the law.
 Finally, article 127(7) of the CC provides a two-year term in which the contractor for
 work must request his compensation, in contrast to the normal term of fifteen years. This
 could be problematic when consecutive consulting services have been provided in cases for
 contesting governmental contracts, as can be observed in decision number 2010 (1998) by
 the Supreme Court. It is advisable that the contractor for work exercises his right speedily
 and regularly.
 22. See infra IV. B.
 23. The Civil Code, art. 490(1) (2002) (ROC).
 24. Id. art. 482.
 25. Id. arts. 492, 493, 505. Their counterparts in the German Civil Code are §§ 644, 633, BGB. See Hanns
 Ullrich, Zum Werkerfolgprisiko beim Forscbungs-und Entwicklungsvertrag, in Festschrift für Wolfgang Fi-
 KENTSCHER, 301 (1998).
 26. The Civil Code, art. 491(2) (2002) (ROC).
 27. Decision No. 1023 (2000) Supreme Court, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw (last visited Aug. 18,
 2002).
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 B. Possible Conflicts Between Parties
 A focal point of conflict lies in determining whether the technology has been transferred.
 The Supreme Court has said in decision number 93 (1998):
 Although the transferor of the technology transfer agreement was of the opinion that it had
 fulfilled its obligation to transfer technology by delivering a 2 3 -page paper document. Yet the
 expert opinion on the 2 3 -page document given by the Industrial Technology Research Institute
 showed that it could not necessarily produce the product, which should contain 36 % chlorine.
 Therefore, it cannot be concluded the licensor has fulfilled its contractual obligation to transfer
 technology. . . .28
 The fact that the licensor owns the patent cannot lead to the conclusion that it has provided
 the transferee with the agreed technology.
 As the Supreme Court further elaborated in decision number 501 (1999), if the tech-
 nology transferor agrees that "it has the ability to produce plank of certain specifications
 utilizing the existing facilities of the transferee, with no extra R&D required,"29 then it
 cannot argue that the failure to produce the plank was due to the fact that the transferee
 did not use the facilities appointed by it.
 IV. IP Rules on Technology Transfer and Licensing Agreements
 A. Overview of IP System
 The Taiwanese IP system30 has gone through tremendous reform in the last decade due
 to two decisive factors: (1) pressure from the United States,31 and (2) Taiwan's determination
 to acquire WTO membership. That is to say, Taiwanese IP law is not a self-grown product
 cultivated consciously by judicial authority. This development only leads to an inventory
 of laws and regulations, which at times appear to be excessive32 yet often inadequate in the
 eyes of businessmen who require certainty.
 As a result, Taiwanese IP law is constantly under revision, which worsens both the ju-
 diciary and the general public's ability to understand and apply the law. Like a road that is
 continually under construction, no vehicle can run safely and speedily on it. A well-
 developed IP system, however, can affect the transfer of technology in several ways, most
 notably through the registration of assignment and licenses, regulation of parallel imports,
 compulsory licenses, and prohibition of IP abuse.
 B. Compulsory Licenses
 Licensing agreements can be reached on a contractual basis or through legal compulsion.
 A compulsory license is a legal instrument that balances the interests of IP right holders on
 28. Decision No. 93 (1998) Supreme Court, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw (last visited Aug.
 18, 2002).
 29. Decision No. 501 (1999) Supreme Court, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw (last visited Aug.
 18, 2002).
 30. The Taiwanese IP system includes the Copyright Act, Patent Act, Trademark Act, Trade Secret Pro-
 tection Act, Integrated Circuit Layout Protection Act, and Plant Seed Act.
 31. See generally Michael Skrehot, Comment, Taiwan's Changing Patent Law: The Cost of Doing Business with
 the World, 30 Int'l Law. 621, 627-31 (1996).
 32. Twenty- two articles in the Copyright Act deal with fair use, and criminal punishment is common.
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 the one hand, and the academic, cultural, and educational needs of the nation on the other.
 The Taiwanese Copyright Act and Patent Act both recognize the compulsory license, yet
 it is seldom, if ever, applied in practice. In contrast to the Copyright Act, the scope of
 compulsory licenses according to the Patent Act is wider. Article 78(1)(2) of the Patent
 Act prescribes:
 (1) In cases of national emergency, the non-profit use of a patent for the enhancement
 of public benefit, or when a person was unable to reach a licensing agreement with
 the patentee concerned under reasonable commercial terms within a considerable
 period of time, the authority in charge of patent matters may, upon request, grant a
 license to put the patented invention into practice, provided that such a practice shall
 be restricted to the purpose of satisfying the domestic market. The request for com-
 pulsory license is limited to non-profit use to enhance public welfare with respect to
 semi-conductor technology.
 (2) In the absence of such situations as set forth in the preceding Paragraph, the authority
 in charge of patent matters still has the discretion to grant a license to practice the
 patented invention upon request if the patentee has conducted unfair competition
 and was definitely punished by the judiciary or by the Fair Trade Commission of the
 Executive Yuan.33
 According to articles 60, 105, and 122 of the Patent Act, patent assignment and license
 agreements that contain one of the following clauses and lead to unfair competition, are
 void: "(1) prohibiting or constraining the assignee to use certain articles or methods not
 provided by the assignor or licensor, or (2) requiring the assignee to purchase from the
 assignor products or materials not protected by the patent."34 These provisions clearly
 resemble article 19(6) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act (FTA).35 The Integrated Circuit
 Layout Protection Act (ICLPA) also has a provision regarding compulsory licenses36 similar
 to that of the Patent Act. Likewise, it is hardly practiced.
 Since the Copyright Act in 1998 reduced the categories of compulsory licenses to only
 one, namely the sound recording of a musical work,37 it can no longer be used to compel
 technology transfer and licensing. Initially, the Copyright Act required that copyright
 33. The Executive Yuan is equivalent to the Cabinet.
 34. Patent Act, arts. 60, 105, 122 (2001) (ROC).
 35. Article 19 of the FTA that is dealt with by this paper reads:
 No enterprise shall have any of the following acts which is likely to lessen competition or to impede
 fair competition:
 1 . causing another enterprise to discontinue supply, purchase or other business transactions with a
 particular enterprise for the purpose of injuring such particular enterprise;
 2. treating another enterprise discriminatively without justification;
 3. causing the trading counterparts) of its competitors to transact business with itself; by coercion,
 inducement with interest, or with improper means.
 6. limiting its trading counterparts' business activity improperly by means of the requirements of
 business engagement. (2000) (ROC).
 Article 25(1) of the Enforcement Rules of the FTA further defines the "limiting" as "tying arrangements,
 exclusive dealing, restrictions on territory, customers or use, and other restrictions on business activities";
 Enforcement Rules, available at http:www.ftc.gov.tw (last visited Aug. 18, 2002).
 36. The Integrated Circuit Layout Protection Act, art. 24 (1995) (ROC).
 37. The Copyright Act, art. 69 (2001) (ROC).
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 protection would only be accorded upon the registration of work. This regulation also applied
 to the transfer and license of copyright. After 1985, the Copyright Act ceased to demand the
 registration of work as a precondition of copyright protection. Yet articles 74 through 78 still
 provided that the then-competent authority, the Copyright Committee of the Ministry of
 Internal Affairs, register people who wanted to keep records of their copyright transactions.
 The registration mechanism of the Copyright Act resulted in serious misunderstandings of
 copyright ownership (presumption of copyright according to registration). It also consumed
 70 percent of the manpower of the Copyright Committee. Registration was therefore aban-
 doned in 1998. Today in the copyright area there is no registration requirement with regard
 to license agreements. This development, however, does not exclude the possibility that pri-
 vate institutions, such as collecting societies, may provide registration services as a means for
 securing evidence proving the ownership of a particular copyright.
 C. Registration
 Registering IP assignments and licenses could generally increase the legal certainty that
 is crucial to IP transactions. Hence, registration is commonly required in Taiwanese IP law.
 Articles 59 and 105 of the Patent Act attach a locus stanai effect to registering assignments
 and license agreements involving invention patents and utility model patents. As a conse-
 quence, such agreement cannot be invoked against any bona fide third party unless regis-
 tered with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) under MOEA - the authority in charge
 of patent affairs. However, assigning and licensing a design patent requires no registration.
 The Taiwanese Trademark Act is somewhat old-fashioned in that it puts more emphasis
 on the protection of consumers than on the trademark right holders. Article 26 of the
 Trademark Act demands registration of the licensing agreement:
 (1) Trademark right holders may license other persons to use their trademarks on all or
 part of the designated goods.
 (2) The licensing needs to be registered with the competent authority in charge of trade-
 mark matters; unregistered licensing may not be held against bona fide third parties.
 The same applies where the licensee sublicenses, with the permission of the trade-
 mark right holder, the use of the trademark.
 (3) The licensed user of a trademark shall indicate on his goods, packages or containers
 thereof the licensing relationship.38
 Article 28(1) requires, with similar wording, that the assignment of trademark rights also
 be registered. A related issue concerns the assignment of rights derived from the application
 for trademark registration. Article 38 of the Trademark Act allows such assignment, but
 urges the assignee to apply to substitute his name for that of the original applicant; otherwise
 the assignment cannot be invoked against any bona fide third party. Article 22 of the In-
 tegrated Circuit Layout Protection Act (ICLPA) also provides that assigning or licensing
 rights on integrated circuit layouts cannot be asserted against bona fide third parties
 if unregistered.
 38. Trademark Act, art. 26 (2002) (ROC).
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 D. Parallel Imports and Territorial Protection
 In considering whether to give IP right holders the exclusive right to import goods
 produced with their permission, one needs to balance the interests of the IP right holders
 to maximize their profits against consumer welfare. However, given the facts that Taiwanese
 citizens do not have many IP rights in foreign countries and that Taiwan is an import
 country for IP rights, the introduction of this exclusive right of importation is at odds with
 Taiwan's interests as a whole. The right to parallel import IP-righted products affects free
 competition and the free flow of goods, both of which are vital to the market economy. As
 the Supreme Court adequately puts it in decision number 5380 (1993): "the parallel import
 of genuine goods may prevent the market from being monopolized, facilitate intra-brand
 price competition, and allow consumers to enjoy the benefit of reasonable prices."39 How-
 ever, due to trade pressure from the United States, the Taiwanese IP system is bent towards
 the interests of IP right holders, and is gradually closing its doors to parallel imports.
 Since January 21, 1994, the Taiwanese Patent Act has recognized in articles 56(1), (2)
 and 117(1) that the patentee of an invention or design patent (but not a utility model
 patent)40 has the exclusive right to manufacture, sell, use, or import the patented matter or
 products that were derived directly from the patented method. This means that any parallel
 import will be disallowed, without the consent of the patentee of an invention or design
 patent. Notably, this right to import did not become effective until January 1, 2002, the
 day on which Taiwan became a member of the WTO. Pursuant to articles 57(2) and 1 18(2)
 of the Patent Act and article 35 of its Implementation Rules, the area in which the right of
 importation exhausts is not mandated by law but can be agreed upon contractually by private
 parties, whether locally, regionally, or globally.41
 In 1993, the Trademark Act followed the decisions of the Supreme Court and adopted
 the "exhaustion theory." Paragraph 3 was added to article 23: "Where the goods bearing a
 trademark are being traded on the market by the owner of the trademark, or by any person
 authorized by him, the owner of the trademark may not exercise his exclusive right over
 the goods, except for the prevention of deterioration or damage of the goods or for any
 other justifiable reason."42
 Accordingly, the parallel import of goods that have been legally traded is principally
 allowed. Only in exceptional cases can the trademark right holder exercise his right to stop
 the flow of goods that might be deteriorating, damaged, and the like. However, it leaves
 39. Decision No. 5380 (1993) Supreme Court, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw (last visited Aug. 18,
 2002).
 40. According to the Annual Report of the IPO, in 2 000 there were altogether 6 1 ,2 3 1 applications tor patents
 filed before the IPO, and 42,42 1 patents were granted. Local inventors took up 59.40 percent and 61.11 percent
 respectively. However, taking a closer look at the types of patents that were granted to them shows that only
 4,223 of those were "invention patents" (with a higher technical level and a protection period of twenty years),
 while 16,874 were utility models (with a protection period of twelve years). Hence, a bulk of the Taiwanese
 R&D achievement was comprised of utility model patents. In addition, 4,715 "design patents" (with a protec-
 tion period of ten years) were issued to Taiwanese applicants.
 41. Patent Act, articles 57(2) and 1 18(2) read: "The area in which sale is permissible is to be determined by
 courts according to facts." Article 35, Implementation Rules of the Patent Act reads: "The area in which the
 sale is permissible according to the last sentence of Articles 57(2) and 1 18(2), is to be determined by provisions
 of contracts; in the cases when contracts are silent or unclear, the area is to be determined by the genuine
 intention of the parties, trading customs or other objective facts of trade." (1994) (ROC).
 42. Trademark Act, art. 23(3) (2002) (ROC).
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 room for doubt. If it is for the preservation of quality of goods, then it is an issue that
 should be and is better dealt with by the Consumers Protection Act. Even if it is for the
 preservation of the good will of trademark right holders, it is not justifiable to grant trade-
 mark right holders a superior position over the property right of owners of the goods. If it
 is meant to protect trademark right holders against an intentional damage of the goods by
 their owners in order to diminish reputation of the former, then it can be sufficiently
 handled by the FTA (either article 22 or 24).43 Furthermore, it is dubious how trademark
 right holders can enforce their right over the goods owned by others - to prohibit the
 continued sale or use of the trademarked goods and sue the continued sale or use of the
 goods for infringement of trademark right?
 The Copyright Act is the forerunner in banning parallel imports. In 1993, articles 87
 and 87a were introduced into the Copyright Act. According to article 87, the import of
 reproductions of copyrighted works that were produced without the consent of the copy-
 right holders, or the import of originals or reproductions of works without the consent of
 copyright holders, is deemed to be an act in violation of the Copyright Act, indirectly
 granting copyright holders the exclusive right to import copyrighted goods.44 Article 87a
 provides several narrowly defined exceptions to the right to import.45 Combined with the
 decree promulgated by the competent authority, one can, for example, parallel import five
 copies of works for non-profit educational or archival purposes, but only one copy when it
 comes to audiovisual works; moreover, one can parallel import only one copy of work for
 personal use and bring only one piece of work as personal luggage back from abroad. The
 violation of the right of importation is subject to two years imprisonment and/or a monetary
 43. Article 22 of the FTCA provides: "No enterprise shall, for the purpose of competition, make or dissem-
 inate any falsehood that is able to damage the business reputation of another." Section 24 of the Fair Trade
 Act reads: "In addition to what is provided for in this Law, no enterprise shall otherwise have any deceptive
 or obviously unfair conduct that is likely to affect trading order."
 44. Note that such a right is not positively listed as copyright.
 45. The Copyright Act, article 87a reads:
 The provisions of subparagraph 4 of the preceding article do not apply to any of the following
 circumstances:
 1. To import the original or copies of a work for the use of central or local government agencies;
 provided, this does not apply to importation for use in schools or other educational institutions, or
 importation of any audiovisual work for purposes other than archival use.
 2. To import the original or a specified number of copies of any audiovisual works in order to supply
 such works to nonprofit scholarly, educational or religious organizations for archival purposes, and to
 import an original or specified number of copies of works other than audiovisual works for library
 lending or archival purposes where the use of such copies conforms with the provisions of Article 48.
 3. To import the original or a specified number of copies of a work, where such copy is for the private
 use of the importer, not for distribution, or where the import is by a person arriving from outside
 the territory, the copy forms a part of such person's personal baggage.
 4. To import the original or copies of a work incorporated into any legally imported goods, machinery,
 or equipment; such original or copies of the work cannot be reproduced during the use or operation
 of the goods, machinery or equipment.
 5. To import an instructional or operational manual accompanying any legally imported goods, ma-
 chinery, or equipment; provided, this does not apply where the instructional or operational manual
 are the principal objects of the importation.
 The "specified number" set forth in subparagraphs 2 and 3 of the proceeding paragraph shall be prescribed
 by the competent authority. (2001) (ROC).
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 punishment in the maximum amount of NT$ 100,00o.46 The ICLPA also provides right
 holders with the exclusive right to prohibit the import and distribution of layouts or inte-
 grated circuits incorporating layouts for commercial purposes.47
 V. Anti-trust Rules
 A. General Remarks
 The inherent tension between IP rights and antitrust is also visible in Taiwan. As article
 40(1) of the TRIPS Agreement puts it, some licensing practices or conditions pertaining
 to IP rights that restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede
 the transfer and dissemination of technology.48 To mitigate, article 45 of the FTA provides
 a general rule: "No provision of this law shall apply to any proper conduct in connection
 with the exercise of rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright, Trademark, or Patent
 Acts."49 How is "proper conduct" to be understood? Generally speaking, any activity that
 aims to serve the purpose of IP rights, such as the provision of sufficient rewards for the
 achievements made by the IP holders, and without the intention of disrupting the function
 of competition and its results, is likely to fall into the category of "proper conduct."
 In the United States, the 1970s pattern of weak patent laws and strong antitrust laws
 reversed in the 1990s with a pattern of strong patent laws and weak antitrust laws.50 Taiwan,
 on the other hand, is equipped with weak patent laws and finds itself at the stage where
 antitrust laws are becoming stronger. It took the Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission (FTC)
 nearly ten years to accomplish its capacity building process to deal with IP misuse issues
 caused by foreign IP holders. In 1993, Cyrix, AMD, and the Business Association of the
 Computer Manufacturing Industry Taipei County, while licensing its patents, accused Intel
 of violating the FTA. Allegedly, Intel engaged in the following activities: price manipula-
 tion, restricting PC manufacturers from using central processing units made by its com-
 petitors, tying in products, compelling Taiwanese manufacturers to sign patent licensing
 agreements, bringing law suits against competitors systematically and continuously, and
 price discrimination. The case ended with an administrative settlement between the FTC
 and Intel in 1996. In 1995, RCA was accused of engaging in anti-competitive activities,
 discriminating in royalties, charging improper royalties, collecting royalties retroactively,
 and using section 337 of the U.S. Customs Act as a negotiation threat. Again, the parties
 reached an administrative settlement.51 These two administrative settlements were not pub-
 licized in the FTC Gazette; hence their contents remain unknown to the general public.
 Of late, a student movement called "Anti-anti piracy" accusing Microsoft of misusing its
 monopolistic power in Taiwan to charge excessive prices has caught the attention of the
 general public and led the FTC to look into the case. After five months investigation, it is
 reported that the FTC is ready to settle with Microsoft.52
 46. Id. art. 93(3).
 47. The Integrated Circuit Layout Protection Act, art. 27(2) (1995) (ROC).
 48. TRIPS Agreement, art. 40(1) (1994).
 49. Fair Trade Act, art. 45 (2000) (ROC).
 50. John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation,
 65 Antitrust L.J. 449 (1997).
 51. Kung-Chung Liu, On the Practice and Theory of Administrative Settlement by the FTC, 235 Taipei Bar J.
 68, 70 (1999) (in Chinese).
 52. See http://www.ftc.gov.tw/showframenew.aspPmenu = CONTENTTB&DisplayKey.
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 B. Guideline on the Review of Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements
 Following the U.S., European, and Japanese rules on technology licensing, the FTC
 promulgated the Review of Technology Licensing Agreements Guideline on January 20,
 2001 . Up to now, the Guideline has not been put to use by the FTC or the courts. It covers
 patents and know-how licenses.53 The FTC does not presume that the licensor possesses
 market power simply because he owns a patent or know-how.54
 1. Analytical Steps
 Point 4 of the Guideline delineates the analytical steps that the FTC will follow.
 (1) The Patent Act Does Not Exclude the Application of the FTA.
 When dealing with technology licensing agreements, the FTC will begin the review
 with article 45 of the FTA. Apparently proper conduct in exercising a right according
 to the Patent Act, which in reality exceeds its boundary of proper conduct and violates
 the legislative intention of this Law to protect inventions, will be handled by the FTA
 in accordance to this Guideline.
 (2) Impact on Relevant Markets:
 When reviewing technology licensing agreements, the FTC will not be bound by
 the forms or language used. Instead, they will concentrate on the possible or actual
 restraint of competition or unfair competition in the following relevant markets:
 i. Goods markets, where the goods produced or provided for through the use of
 the licensed technology;
 ii. Technology markets which are defined by the substitutability for the technology
 at issue; and
 iii. Innovation markets which are defined by the scope of possible product R&D.
 (3) Factors to Be Considered
 When reviewing technology licensing agreements, the FTC will not only take
 into account reasonableness of the relevant clauses, but will also consider the
 following factors:
 i. The market power of the licensor over the licensed technology;
 ii. The market standing of parties to the licensing agreements and the market
 situation;
 iii. The impact of the licensing agreements on the possibility of using the technology
 at issue and the exclusion of competition;
 iv. The difficulty or ease of market entry;
 v. The limiting period of the licensing agreements; and
 vi. The international or industrial practices on the relevant technology licensing
 markets.
 2. White Clauses
 The Guideline contains the so-called black, white, and gray clauses and gives examples
 thereof, illustratively but not exhaustively.55 Point 5 of the Guideline stipulates that pro-
 visions of the licensing agreements with regard to the following do not violate the FTA:
 53. FTC, Review of Technology Licensing Agreements Guideline, point 2(2) (2001) [hereinafter Guideline].
 54. Id. at point 3.
 55. Id. heading of points 5, 6, and 7.
 WINTER 2002
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Mon, 18 May 2020 09:05:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 1158 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
 i. Restricting clauses that determine the scope in which licensees may practice be
 limited to manufacture, use or sell.
 ii. Restricting clauses that within the term of the patents limit the period of the li-
 censing agreements; or restricting clauses that limit the period of the licensing agree-
 ments before the secrecy of the licensed know-how was lost due to reason not at-
 tributable to the licensees.
 iii. Royalty agreements that for the sake of easy calculation determine the amount of
 royalties in accordance with: (a) the amount of manufactured or sold final products
 using the licensed technology, in cases where the licensed technology is part of the
 manufacturing process; or (b) the amount of raw materials or components used to
 manufacture the licensed technological products in cases where the licensed tech-
 nology exists in the components.
 iv. Royalty agreements that prescribe for licensees to pay royalties even after the ex-
 piration of patents for the licensed technology, in cases where it was agreed that the
 royalties to be paid in installments or not to be paid until the technology was prac-
 ticed; royalty agreements prescribing that in cases where the know-how was publi-
 cized due to reasons not attributable to the licensors, their licensees still have to pay
 royalties for the period based on the agreed upon method until the licensing agree-
 ments have become ineffective or terminated.
 v. Agreements that prescribe for the licensees grant back on a non-exclusive basis,
 improvements or new methods of applying the licensed technology to the licensors.
 vi. Agreements that demand the licensees make the best effort to manufacture, and sell
 the licensed products.
 vii. Agreements that demand the licensees, over the duration of licensing agreements
 or after their expiration, to keep the confidentiality of know-how that is still secret.
 viii. Agreements that stipulate the minimum amount of products that should utilize the
 licensed technology or that dictate the minimum amount of products to be sold, in
 order to insure the minimum amount of royalty is received by the licensors.
 ix. Agreements that stipulate the licensees maintain a certain quality of products, raw
 materials, or components of the licensed technology to the extent necessary for the
 licensed technology to produce a certain utility and the licensed products to maintain
 certain quality.
 x. Agreements that prohibit transferring or sub-licensing of the licensed technology
 by the licensees.
 xi. Agreements that exclude the licensees from practicing the licensed technology be-
 yond the expiry date of the licensing agreements where the licensed patents are still
 valid or the licensed know-how continues to remain secret.56
 However, the Guideline does not exclude the possibility that after taking Points 3 and 4
 into consideration, the lawfulness of the above clauses will be denied.
 3. Black Clauses
 Point 6 of the Guideline lists some provisions as per se illegal:
 i. A violation of article 14 of the FTA occurs when the parties to the technology licensing
 agreement, that are also in a competitive relationship with one another by means of
 56. Id. at point 5.
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 contract, agreement, or any other form of mutual understanding, jointly determine
 the price of the licensed product, limit the quantity, trading counterparts, trading
 territory, and R&D area, or restrict the business activities of each other and may in
 doing so influence the function of the market.
 ii. Technology licensing agreements that contain one of the following situations and that
 impose a danger to restrain competition or impede fair competition of a specific mar-
 ket, violate article 19(6) of the FTA:
 a) Restricting parties to the technology licensing agreement or their related enter-
 prises from competing in the R&D, manufacture, usage or sale of competing
 products.
 b) Prescribing the marketing method for the licensees, restricting the scope in which
 the licensees can use the technology, or restricting their trading counterparts in
 order to segment customers.
 c) Compelling the licensees to buy, accept or use the technology or know-how that
 they don't need.
 d) Compelling licensees to grant back exclusively, any improvements they have made
 on the licensed technology or know-how.
 e) Restricting the freedom of the licensees to use patents or know-how that has ex-
 pired or has been publicized due to reasons not attributable to the licensees or
 asking the licensees to continue to pay royalties for them.
 f) Restricting licensees from manufacturing, using or selling competing products or
 from adopting a competing technology after the technology licensing agreement
 expires.
 g) Restricting the price at which licensees may sell the licensed products that they
 have manufactured or produced to third parties.
 h) Restricting licensees from challenging the effectiveness of the technology in
 question.
 i) The refusal by the licensors to provide the licensees with the contents, scope and
 terms of their patents.
 4. Grey Clauses
 According to Point 7 of the Guideline, the following provisions of technology licensing
 agreements, if imposing a danger to restrain competition or impede fair competition of a
 relevant market, may violate article 19(6) of the FTA:
 i. Segmenting within the term of patents the licensing territories within Taiwan, seg-
 menting the licensing territories within Taiwan before the secrecy of know-how was
 lost due to reasons not attributable to the licensors.
 ii. Restricting the sales territory or counterparts of the licensees, whereas the scope of
 restriction has nothing to do with its area of application. Restricting the area and
 scope of application where licensees can practice the licensed technology.
 iii. Imposing an upper limit for licensees to manufacture or sell products, or limiting the
 number that the licensees can practice the patents or know-how.
 iv. Requesting that the licensees sell through licensors or through person designated by
 the licensors.
 v. Demanding licensees to pay royalties according to the amount of products manufac-
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 tared or sold by licensees, irrespective of whether the licensed technology was
 practiced.57
 The restriction demanded by the licensors of the licensing agreements that the licensees
 procure from the licensors, or parties designated by them, materials or components that
 are not within a reasonable and necessary scope for the licensed technology to reach a
 specific performance, or to maintain the reputation of the trademarks or the secrecy of
 know-how, and that may lead to likelihood of constraining competition or impeding fair
 competition, may violate article 19(1) or (6). The discrimination imposed by the technology
 licensing agreements without proper reason against the licensees with regard to trading
 conditions, royalties and the like, that may lead to likelihood of constraining competition
 or impeding fair competition, may violate article 19(2).
 C. Horizontal Restraints and Patent Pools
 1. Horizontal Restraints
 A common instrument that IP right holders can use to restrain horizontal competition
 is to issue warning letters to intimidate potential counterparts of competitors. This tool is
 highly effective, as most would rather avoid trouble and accept the asserted infringement
 at face value. With no judicial precedent and comparable foreign experiences available, the
 FTC has, out of its own creativity, conceived and promulgated the Guideline on the Review
 of Warning Letters Alleging the Infringement of a Copyright, Trademark or Patent Right.
 According to Point 3 of this Guideline, the issuance of warning letters is an absolutely
 proper conduct to exercise one's right accorded by the Copyright, Trademark, and Patent
 Act after the completion of one of the following procedures:
 i. A determination by a court of first instance that infringement of a copyright, trade-
 mark or patent right took place.
 ii. An expert opinion confirming the infringement has been made by an institution, which
 was jointly appointed by the Judicial Yuan and the Executive Yuan; and the manufac-
 turer, importer or agent who may have committed the infringement has been notified
 by the right holders to cease the infringement.
 In cases where due diligence of care has been taken or in situations where notification is
 objectively impossible, die aforementioned notification requirement becomes non-binding.58
 However, according to Point 4 of the Guideline, the issuance of warning letters after the
 completion of one of the following procedures is itself a proper conduct for exercising one's
 right accorded by the Copyright, Trademark, and Patent Acts, provided that Points 6-9
 have not been violated:
 i. An expert opinion confirming an institution, which was not jointly appointed by the
 Judicial Yuan and the Executive Yuan; and the manufacturer, importer or agent who
 may have committed the infringement, has made the infringement has been notified
 by the right holders in advance to eliminate the infringement.
 57. Id. at point 7.
 58. Id. at point 3.
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 ii. The warning letter has stated the specific contents and scope of the copyright, trade-
 mark or patent in question and the concrete infringing activity, so that the receiving
 party can make a reasonable judgment; and the manufacturer, importer or agent that
 may have committed the infringement has been notified by the right holders in ad-
 vance to eliminate the infringement.59
 In cases where due diligence of care has been taken or notification is objectively impossible,
 the aforementioned notification requirement becomes non-binding.
 Following Point 4 procedure does not exempt issuance of warning letters from the articles
 19(1) and (3), 21 (misleading presentations) and 22 (trade libel) of the FTA,60 if the re-
 quirement of the respective article has been met. Nor does it exclude the application of
 article 24 when:
 i. No legal copyright, trademark, or patent exists;
 ii. The scope of the copyright, trademark, or patent has been exaggerated;
 iii. It has been falsely stated or implied that its competitors or in general other compet-
 itors on the market are illegally infringing its copyright, trademark, or patent; or
 iv. A deceptive or obviously unfair statement was made,
 and the trading order is likely to be affected.61
 The direct issuance of warning letters without following Point 3 or 4 procedures may violate
 article 24 of the FTA, if the trading order is likely to be affected.62 The Guideline is effectively
 enforced by the FTC and has cured the abusive practice of issuing warning letters.
 2. PatentPool
 Unlike the United States, which has a legal history of 100 years of dealing with patent
 pools,63 the antitrust issue of patent pools is just emerging in Taiwan. The Guideline on the
 Review of Technology Licensing Agreements promulgated by the FTC does not address
 this issue at all. The pro-competitive effects of patent pools are obvious, and include re-
 ducing transaction and litigation costs, clearing blocking patents, and facilitating the rapid
 development of technology.64 It is also indisputable that the "ubiquity of patent pools on
 the industrial landscape demonstrates that this is an institutional mechanism capable of
 simplifying transactions in a wide variety of industries. As more and more IPs are issued,
 potential transaction costs will grow as well, making pools even more important."65 How-
 ever, if we were to look at it from the viewpoint of licensees, who are not members of patent
 pools, the anti-competitive effects of patent pools seem just as persuasive.
 In 1999, Taiwanese enterprises accused Phillips Electronics, N.V., the Sony Corporation
 (Japan), and Taiyo Yuden (Japan) of abusing their monopolistic power on the CD-R market
 59. Id. at point 4.
 60. Id. at points 6-8.
 61. Id. at point 9.
 62. Id.
 63. Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 357, 373-76 (1999).
 64. Id. at 379-381; U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines For the Licensing of Intellectual
 Property, 5.5 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/utr/public/guidelines/ipguid/htm (last visited Aug. 18,
 2002).
 65. Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding
 the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 123, 154 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
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 by demanding excessive royalties,66 engaging in cartel activities by bundling patents and by
 licensing in packages, tying in patents that have already expired, and obscuring information
 about the patents to be licensed.67 This time, the FTC found that the defendants indeed
 violated several articles of the FTA.
 The FTC determined that the defendants were horizontal competitors in the CD-R
 patent-licensing market. The defendants' assertion that the patents they owned were col-
 lectively necessary for the production of a certain product, and that the patents comple-
 mented each other, did not affect the determination of a horizontal relationship, since the
 defendants admitted that they still offered individual licenses competitively.
 The FTC went on to find that the defendants violated article 14 of the FTA by engaging
 in two cartel activities. First, Sony and Taiyo Yuden promised Phillips that "all the licensing
 requests on their patents at issue will be forwarded to Phillips, and no other licensing
 agreements will be agreed upon, except for other cross licensing agreements of a broad
 coverage."68 Second, Phillips, in its response to the complainant, stated, "Phillips, Sony and
 Taiyo Yuden have all agreed that there is only one way of calculating royalty, namely 3 %
 of the net sales price and at least 10 Japanese Yen for each CD-R."69 Such cartel activities
 were sufficient to affect the market function of producing and trading products or providing
 services, because the defendants owned all the patents necessary for the production of CD-
 Rs and thus together possessed a worldwide monopoly status; the collective licensing left
 no room for individual licensing.
 The FTC further held that the defendants engaged in monopolistic conduct by under-
 taking through a cartel in the CD-R patent-licensing market, and that they also violated
 articles 10(2), (4) of the FTA.70 Phillips defended their royalty scheme as necessary to
 recovering their tremendous R&D investment at the time when licensing agreements were
 first negotiated. However, the FTC looked into the drastic price drop (U.S.$7 for each
 CD-R in 1996, and less than U.S.S0.5 in 2000) and the sixty-fold growth in volume world-
 wide (182 million CD-R in 1997 and 3.6 billion CD-R in 2000). It came to the conclusion
 that the maintenance of such a royalty scheme would reap for the defendants royalties of
 twenty to sixty times more in 2000 than the expected amount. On the other hand, defen-
 dants refused to lower their royalty scheme to match market demand. Hence the defendants
 were found guilty of abusing their monopolistic market power through charging royalties
 far in excess of those expected by the licensors.
 66. The demanded royalty is the higher of 3 percent of the net sales price or ten Japanese Yen for each CD-
 R-currently, ten Yen is about 17.8 percent of the sales price of a CD-R in contrast to the average royalty of
 less than 5 percent in most computer industries.
 67. Decision No. 21 (2001) of the FTC, see Phillips Electronics, N.V. et al., 10 FTC Gazette 2001, No. 2,
 151-180.
 68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. Article 10 of the FTA prescribes:
 No monopolistic enterprise shall:
 1. directly or indirectly prevent other enterprises from competing by unfair means;
 2. improperly set, maintain, or change the prices for goods or the remuneration for services;
 3. make a trading counterpart give preferential treatment without justification; or
 4. otherwise abuse its market power.
 (2000) (ROC).
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 Phillips et al. were also found to be illusive about important trading information, such
 as the contents, scope, terms of patents and the number of patents they individually owned.
 Moreover, the FTC found defendants' demands that licensees withdraw their applications
 for the invalidity of patents, as a precondition for concluding the licensing contracts was
 improper conduct for exercising one's patent rights. All of these mounted to a so-called
 exploitative abuse of monopoly power and therefore violated article 10(4) of the FTA.
 Thus, Phillips must pay a fine of NT$8 million, Sony NT$4 million, and Taiyo-Yuden
 NT$2 million.71
 The Taiwan experience shows that multinational conglomerates are not immune to temp-
 tation when it comes to conducting anti-competitive activities, especially in the name of
 intellectual property. Given the already unbridgeable imbalance between the licensing and
 licensed parties,72 no one can expect OEM companies to check or challenge the validity of
 the patents in question. Additionally, patent pools formed by the IP giants further worsen
 the position of licensees. It has been suggested that open membership and non-exclusive
 licensing among pool members be taken as an important mechanism for preventing anti-
 competitive harm from pooling.73 However, this seems insufficient. The step and direction
 that the Taiwanese FTC has taken in placing patent pools and cross licensing agreements
 under the scrutiny of rules concerning cartel and the abuse of monopoly power, is more
 appropriate action.
 VI. Conclusion
 To conclude, a brief recap follows:
 i. Inward and outward investment, whether in the form of capital or technology, is
 subject to prior approval by the Investment Commission, MOEA. Approval is rou-
 tinely granted, except for certain investments with Mainland China. A wide range of
 tax incentives is available for inward investment.
 ii. In Taiwan, technology transfer or licensing agreements will typically be treated as
 contracts for work. It is, however, suggested to contractually exclude provisions of the
 CC that rest the risks of payment entirely with the contractor for work,
 iii. The Copyright Act, Patent Act and the Integrated Circuit Layout Protection Act
 provide for compulsory licensing. Yet they are seldom used. The parallel import of
 patented goods or protected integrated circuit layouts is permissible only with the
 consent of the patentee of an invention or design patent or the right holder of inte-
 grated circuit layouts. Parallel import of copyrighted goods by non-copyright holders
 is allowed only on a very limited basis. In contrast, the parallel import of trademarked
 goods is allowed in principle.
 iv. The importance of antitrust rules with regard to patent and know-how licensing
 agreements in Taiwan is expected to increase with the promulgation of Guideline of
 Technology Licensing Agreements by the FTC. The FTC has recently placed the
 patent pools and cross licensing agreements under the scrutiny of rules concerning
 cartel and abuse of monopoly power.
 71. Phillips Electronics, N.V. et al., 10 FTC Gazette 2001, No. 2, 151-180.
 72. In the Phillips case, more than 100 foreign patents are involved, none of which are Taiwanese.
 73. Merges, supra note 65, at 164.
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